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- From: PILCH Hartmut phm@a2e.de
- Subject: [Patents] How to interpret US opinions on patents
- Date: Mon, 25 Dec 2000 13:16:54 +0100 (CET)
_________________________________________________________________
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Some notes on Hart 1997: How to interpret US opinions on patents
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It has been argued by patent lawyers that the United States introduced
software patents after a conscious, public-opinion based debate.
However, this is perception apparently is not based on solid evidence.
One of the opinion leaders of the debate at the European Union, Robert
Hart, actually found it necessary to grossly misrepresent reference
texts to support this perception.
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Robert Hart has been a [88]long-term advocate in favor of software
patents in Europe and only recently wrote an "independent" [89]study
on software patents for the European Commission's [90]Directorate for
the Internal Market (DGIM).
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The Hart paper of 1997 was published in a context where the European
Commission was formulating its policy on software patents as expressed
in the [91]Greenpaper and its [92]follow-up papers. Like most patent
lawyers, Hart's basic argument is that computer programs are
equivalent to some currently patentable inventions and should
therefore also be patentable:
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Patent systems have been created to stimulate the evolution of
existing and the creation of new industry by protecting the
industrial application of innovations. The computer software
industry needs that stimulation as much as any other industry.
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...To deny patent protection for such inventions would I believe
remove from the patent system a significant industry thereby
severely disadvantaging the innovators in that industry encouraging
second comers rather than original creators upon whom any industry
relies heavily for its evolution. (p. 252)
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In the paper, the argumentation goes
1. Introduction
2. boundaries of copyright
1. the need for protection beyond copyright
2. what inventions could be patented
3. position of the EPO
4. history
5. policy
6. trade secrets
3. conclusion
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From this design it is obvious section 2.2 is the actual main argument
whether patentability is desirable, so let me check it for scholarly
consistency. The main arguments are given as quotes from (I) a
manifesto for sui generis protection and (II) an OTA report.
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1. Reinterpreting a manifesto for a sui generis protection as justification
for patents
Hart summarizes the Columbia Law Review paper [98]A Manifesto
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs as
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Effectively the Manifesto considers that there should be (i)
copyright protection for the literal expression of the program
code, (ii) patent protection for those functional features of the
computer program and their application that meet the level of
protection required by the patent system and (iii) an anti-cloning
system to protect the program behavior not protected by the patent
system.
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However, in the manifesto document, "patents" does not occur in the
TOC, nor in the conclusion, the only mention I have (passim) so far
found is "the issue of a large number of questionable patents for
software related ideas may impede competitive development and
follow-on innovation in the software industry" (p. 2422). The
emphasis seems to call for a sui generis protection (like the
semiconductor act, cf pp. 2413-2420). Again, from the manifesto's
conclusion:
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We propose to remedy market-destructive appropriatins of program
behavior and the industrial designs aimed at producing efficient
program behavior through a period of automatic anti-cloning
protection of these innovations. The period should be long enough
enough to give efficient incentives to invest in the development of
innovative software, yet short enough to avert the market failure
that would result if second competitors and follow-on inventors
were blocked from entering the market long after the first fim had
recouped its initial investment. (p. 2430)
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It is clear one does not even have to share the call for sui
generis semiconducor-like protection desired by that manifesto (so
may be of limited usefulness for those opposed to software
protection beyond copyright), but to state they advocated patents
for programs seems abusive.
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2. Taking what is useful from the OTA report
The conclusions of the [99]OTA report (Section 1, pp. 32ff) are
neutral:
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Option 2.1: Refine the statutory definition of patentable subject
matter to provide guidance for the courts and PTO. Legislation
might address the extent to which processes implemented in software
or mathematical algorithms are or are not statutory subject matter.
Legislation might also address the issue of special exemptions,
such as for research and education).
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Option 2.2: Exclude software-related inventions and/or algorithms
from the patent law and create a special, sui generis protection
within a patent framework for some inventions. The latter might
have a shorter term, lower criteria for inventiveness, and/or
special exemptions from infringement.
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However, the section that Hart quotes in length (on p. 132 of the
report in its Section 4) in a way suggesting this also would be the
OTA's direct recommendation, is just a summary of the USPTO arguments
and of no recommendative meaning, in the same manner one could quote
nearly the entire p. 136 of said Section 4 which summarizes objections
to software patentability.
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3. Conclusion
To defend Hart, the OTA report is presented in a more balanced way in
his section 2(f) (p. 251). But the fact that both pillars of the core
"why we need patents" section are hollow leaves a somewhat bitter
taste in the argumentation's overtones "the US know what they are
doing".
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Hart also does not tell us that at the 1994 USPTO hearings, only a
fraction of software companies (among them Microsoft) argued clearly
in favor of software patents, whereas a larger fraction considered
software patents harmful to business interests (among them Oracle,
Adobe). Of course, there also was a broad field of undecided
statements and statements from law firms in favor of software patents.
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Even in 2000 the USPTO conducted a similar hearing. Yet, however
critical the opinions raised in these hearings, it was always unlikely
that they would have any impact, since the decisions in the US were
not taken by Congress, and not even by the USPTO, but by a few courts,
namely the CAFC. Some proponents of software patents in Europe have
tried to create an impression that the US and Japan have decided in
favor of software patentability after some careful and conscious
public deliberation process. The facts don't support that assertion.
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4. Further Reading
* Robert Hart 1997, The Case for Patent Protection for Computer
Program-Related Inventions, in: The computer law and security
report, 13(4), 247-252.
* [100]OTA 1992, OTA-TCT-527, Finding a Balance: Computer Software,
Intellectual Property and the Challenge of Technological Change
* [101]Pamela Samuelson et al. 1994, A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer, Columbia Law Review, 94(8),
2308-2431.
* [102]United States Patent and Trademark Office, Public Hearing on
Use of the Patent System to Protect Software-Related Inventions,
Transcript of Proceedings, 1994
* [103]The Impact of Granting Patents for Information Innovations
(This report by the US National Research Council from July 2000
criticizes that the decision in favor of software patentability
was taken by lawcourts without any backing from Congress.)
* [104]R=E9ponse de l'Isoc-France =E0 la Consultation sur la
Brevetabilit=E9 du Logiciel de la Direction G=E9n=E9rale du March=E9
Int=E9rieur de la Commission Europ=E9enne (This consultation paper
from the French Section of the Internet Society criticizes the IPI
study and specially mentions bad argumentation by Robert Hart
within this study.)
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5. Acknowledgements
The body of this review was researched and written by Holger Blasum,
thanks to hints from Thomas Ebinger. Editorial responsibility is taken
by Hartmut Pilch
_________________________________________________________________
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http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/clsr-rhart97/indexen.html
2000-12-20 FFII Swpat Workgroup
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References
88. http://www.softprot.demon.co.uk/indpatent.htm
89. http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/intprop/indprop/study.pd=
f
90. http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/
91. http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/intprop/indprop/paten.pd=
f
92. http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/intprop/indprop/8682en.p=
df
93. http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/clsr-rhart97/#suigen
94. http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/clsr-rhart97/#ota
95. http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/clsr-rhart97/#klud
96. http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/clsr-rhart97/#ref
97. http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/clsr-rhart97/#auth
98. http://wwwsecure.law.cornell.edu/commentary/intelpro/manifint.htm#int=
ro
99. http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1992/9215.html
100. http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1992/9215.html
101. http://wwwsecure.law.cornell.edu/commentary/intelpro/manifint.htm#int=
ro
102. http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/ca_softpatent.testimony
103. http://swpat.ffii.org/vreji/papri/digidilem00/indexen.html
104. http://www.isoc.asso.fr/PRESSE/ce-brvt.htm
- [Patents] How to interpret US opinions on patents, PILCH Hartmut phm
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