Re: [Patents] "Betrayal of physics"

[Seth Johnson <seth.johnson@RealMeasures.dyndns.org>]

Hartmut Pilch wrote:
> 
> > Aside from the fact that I think the "mind/matter" phrase, while 
> > venerable,
> > actually doesn't work well, I think that the point about ideal abstraction
> > is the most important one to make.
> 
> "Mind" is confusing wording, because it implies subjectivity.  The
> borderline which we are interested in is not subjective-objective but
> rather abstract entity vs denoted material reality.
> 
> Within the patent system, the mind/matter conception, no matter how you
> phrase it, be it in the DE ABS 1980 or US Diamond v. Diehr 1981 wording,
> is as straightforward to apply today as it was back then.
> 
> When looking at patents, you can easily place them in one of the two
> categories.  It's much easier than determining non-obviousness.
> 
> Even if in some cases there are difficulties, these difficulties are are
> unrelated to the information theory & physics debates about which GregBot
> keeps reporting.
> 
> The main difficulty is not in distinguishing mind/data/abstraction from
> matter but in determining the scope of the solution:  are the forces of
> nature part of it or are they "post-solution activity" (US wording), i.e.
> do they only "come into play after the solution has been established"
> (DE wording).


You are essentially stating nearly the same general ideas I was saying, with
more focus on practical questions of legal foundation.

However, I emphasize something else more: People who have vulgar empirical
notions don't understand the terms "mind/matter" the way they need to; or
they either need to be reminded or they are easily duped by mumbo jumbo from
con artist patent professionals.  I am not recommending not using the terms,
just pointing out that people need to be told what is meant by them. 
Nothing else will so closely steer people to understanding the whole
matter.  We need to tell people this for these reasons -- because they don't
think about it (you have noted this tendency in English and American
outlooks; it's also endemic to the patent professional class working to make
this ludicrous pro-swpat policy, regardless of cultural background).  People
just need to hear it stated that ideal abstraction is *by nature* not the
kind of thing that can be appropriated.  I assert that this point clarifies
things for people who are trying to understand what it is we mean about
algorithms that really makes them different.

Then there is the subsequent step of explaining that other devices that are
controlled by algorithms running on a logic device make no difference to the
abstract nature of the algorithms themselves.  As ideal abstractions,
algorithms are not confined to a device.

Algorithms written for a logic device are unique because the logic device is
unique.  The logic device is abstract, generic and universal in the respect
that what it automates is logic, not more esoteric processes or mechanisms;
and it is nothing other than the existence of such generic logic devices
that has created the special category of "software" which needs to be
treated as just as abstract and ideal as other things which have
traditionally been excluded from patentability.


> Also, how you analyse friction in terms of "forces of nature" is
> unimportant.  The term "forces of nature" is merely used because it is
> established in physics and these forces imply causality and repeatability,
> both important features of technical inventions.  If the term "forces of
> nature" really led to confusion (not just artificial confusion created by
> GregBot & Co), one could rephrase it without any loss.


I was only saying that the point about explaining friction didn't hit home
to me as relevant to a patent claim.

Regarding the term "forces of nature," I think there's a perverseness going
on -- something like a sense that "forces of nature" is too limiting (or
"metaphysical" or something), while at the same time people don't understand
ideality and abstraction.  Employing the "forces of nature" language is
essential.  Perhaps when people start recognizing (and remembering) that the
abstract stuff isn't supposed to be patentable, then we can talk about other
ways of articulating the policy.

I hold that this set of points, asserting the nature of ideality and
abstraction, is key in that it works to give non-legal folks practical
understanding of the real issue (and in fact we are starting to see this
kind of understanding reflected in some of the media we're getting --
finally!).  It works really well on that level.  Another advantage of it is,
if we talk in these terms, then all the other points (including among many
the point that if abstraction is patentable then basic freedom is under
attack) begin to become less political appearing to many people, more as
self-evident and common sense corollaries.


Seth



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