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Laura Creighton wrote:
But in patents it is different, as Bhagwati m
entions: "we have here the economist’s tradeoff: more IPP means more knowl
edge but it also reduces diffusion. The social optimum lies somewhere in the middle, as often."


I think that the assertion 'more IPP means more knowledge' is highly
debatable.  It is trying to measure the knowledge gained by people
snip ...

Yes and quite a bit of modern economic research backs this up. More IP does not /even/ mean more knowledge. And it guarantees /more monopolies/. The original 'crude' stuff (e.g. Arrow 1962 and Nordhaus 1969 and following) just assume:
1. only way to appropriate returns / exclude others from innovation/R&D is 
with IP
2. that innovation is 'one-shot' (so not cumulative)
3. no transaction cost issues or imperfect information issues (for example in the real world the scope of a patent will be never be perfectly specified)
4. ideas are completely non-rival / infinitely expansible. That is: there is precisely 0 cost of reproduction and reproduction can be done instantaneously
...

As I am sure some of you know recent work such as Bessen and Maskin 1999 (sequential innovation, patents and innovation) show that altering assumption 2 can lead to patents being a hindrance to innovation.

On an even stronger tack recent other work by Boldrin and Levine and others on changing assumption 4 entirely overturns the traditional analysis. It shows that even in a world with no IP rights at all innovation could and would be paid for. In fact when fixed costs of innovation are sufficiently small without IP you can obtain the 'Pareto' optimum (sorry for the economists jargon).

What's worse, it cannot measure the people, who considered embarking
on an investigation that is likely to produce knowledge, but stopped.
They believed it was more likely that they would be the third, fourth,
fifth or sixth discoverer, rather than the first. Thus they feared their effort would be wasted -- whatever they discovered would be
owned by patent-holder #1.  So they never bothered to discover it all
all.  Nobody did.  We still don't know it.

This isn't an argument for inefficiency however. there is a long literature on patent races addressing some of these precise issues (is there too much or too little innovation in a 'winner takes all' system)

Since you cannot measure these things it is hard to conclude that the
knowledge stronger IPP will inspire outnumbers the knowedge stronger
IPP will inhibit.  It is in the realm of the unknowable.

Absolutely and this is a constant problem in this debate that the empirical evidence is so scant and so uncertain. However you can still try - there are certainly quite of a lot of anecdotal/case study work on the uses and values of IP in different industries.

Regards,

Rufus





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